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1 Introduction
A large and growing literature investigates the effects of institutions on economic performance
and finds that good institutions promote economic development.1 Much of this literature
is based on cross-country studies that are likely subject to contamination due to country
differences in accounting standards, taxation, and bankruptcy laws. This literature also fails
to account for obvious outliers such as China — the unprecedented economic growth over
the past three decades in China has been based largely on weak institutions and inefficient
financial intermediation (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005). In this paper, we use an investment
Euler equation framework to examine the extent to which institutions affect Chinese firms’
investment behavior. Applying generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators to large
samples of Chinese industrial firms, we estimate the rates these firms use to discount future
investment payoffs. We then examine how this investment-implied return on capital or
discount rate varies across variables measuring institutions. We document robust evidence
that ownership is the primary institutional factor affecting firm-level return on capital in
China. The investment-implied return on capital for a non-state firm is approximately 10
percentage points higher than that of an otherwise equal state firm. We also find that state
firms use higher discount rates to invest after they are partially privatized and that firms
with better corporate governance have a higher return on capital.
The motivations for our inquiry are three fold. First, there is little empirical evidence
at the micro level on the dynamic relation between corporate investment and institutions.
For instance, while heavy investment and exports have long been viewed as two pillars of
China’s economic ascendancy, few studies examine how institutional factors shape Chinese
firms’ investment behavior. We contribute to this line of research by presenting evidence from
large samples of Chinese industrial firms. Second, extant studies rely largely on cross-country
analysis and reduced-form regressions. Drawing clean inferences from these studies might be
1See, e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Levine and Zervos, 1998;
Rajan and Zingales, 1998; and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 2005.
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difficult as they are unavoidably plagued by endogeneity. By estimating a structural model of
corporate investment, we potentially mitigate this concern. Third, in our structural setting,
the effects of institutions on corporate investment are readily captured by the stochastic
discount rates inferred from actual corporate investment. This investment-implied return on
capital reveals firm managers’ true propensity to investment and can be interpreted in an
intuitive way. In addition, our approach is not restricted to publicly listed firms, and imposes
minimal requirements on capital market information, and thus may be useful for research
on emerging markets, where capital markets are under-developed and financial disclosure is
limited and less transparent.
We begin by constructing a standard intertemporal investment model that characterizes
the investment allocation of a utility-maximizing firm manager. The manager maximizes
utility by choosing how much income to consume and how much income to invest in each
period. Dividend consumption is constrained by the firm’s profit function and the manager’s
investment decision. The manager chooses the optimal level of investment so as to be
indifferent between investing today and investing tomorrow. The model produces results
in terms of intertemporal investment substitution where the stochastic discount factor is
related to the manager’s risk preference — a lower discount factor (a higher discount rate)
corresponds to a more cautious attitude toward corporate investment. The model allows
firm managers’ discount rates to vary across variables measuring institutions. The effects of
institutions on corporate investment are thus captured by the differences in discount rates
that firm managers use to make investment decisions.
The intuition for using an investment Euler equation to assess the effect of institutions on
corporate investment is easiest to see in a simple two-period example. When a firm manager
considers investing today versus tomorrow, he has to consider the costs and benefits of
this decision. Investing today entails a cost today whereas investing tomorrow defers the
cost until later and thus reduces this cost in terms of its present value. However, investing
tomorrow entails forgoing the marginal product of capital for one period. An investment
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Euler equation is simply a first-order condition that equates the marginal cost of investing
today and the expected discounted cost of investing tomorrow. In this setting, the discount
rate characterizes the manager’s willingness to invest. If the manager becomes more cautious
or less willing to embark on new and risky projects, this increased caution will be reflected
as an increase in the discount rate.
We expect that all else being equal, the discount rates used by managers of state owned
enterprises (SOEs hereafter) to discount future investment payoffs are lower than those
used by managers of other types of firms. Denoting the discount rate for an SOE as rSOE
and the discount rate for other types of firms as r, we conjecture that r = rSOE + θ. In
the Chinese context, θ is likely to be greater than 0 for two reasons. First, due to their
soft budget constraints, SOEs are aﬄicted with an “investment hunger” problem (see, e.g.,
Kornai, 1980); they demonstrate stronger preference for investment, and adopt relatively
lower discount rates. Over-investment is thus more likely to be a concern among SOEs.
Second, non-state firms, especially private firms, are exposed to a variety of institutional
constraints (e.g., policy and tax distortions and expropriation by the government), and
hence may be more cautious about investment.
Notably, a positive θ may also result from a high level of financing constraints facing
non-state firms simply because these firms are not favored by the state-dominated financial
system. Institutional deficiencies and financing constraints interact to affect corporate
investment in China. While our empirical strategy centers on exploring the magnitude
and distribution of θ, it cannot disentangle the impact of external financing constraints from
that of institutions. However, we believe that a positive θ is mainly driven by institutional
deficiencies for three reasons. First, asymmetric access to finance is itself a reflection of
poor institutions (i.e., lack of a level playing ground). Second, when we compare SOEs to
mixed-ownership firms, the majority of which are former SOEs that are still controlled by
the state, we find that while the mixed firms display no significant difference in their access
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to external finance, their θ is significantly positive.2 Third, we find similar results when we
apply the same approach to the privatized SOEs and the listed firms in China, which are
less subject to external financing constraints.
Our empirical analysis formalizes the above intuition. The Euler equation governs the
manager’s decision on how much to invest. The Markovian nature of our model reduces
the manager’s infinite-horizon dynamic problem to an optimality condition concerning
investment this period versus next period. The effects of institutions on corporate investment
are captured by θ, which is closely related to institutional variables such as ownership. It is
possible to identify these effects from the cross-sectional variation in corporate investment.
Further, after controlling for a measure of investment opportunity (i.e., capital productivity),
we can identify whether cross-sectional variation in investment is caused by differences in
the stochastic discount rate or differences in productivity, which alleviates the endogeneity
concern that arises in a reduced-form regression framework. We interpret higher discount
rates among well-governed firms as evidence that good institutions mitigate over-investment.
Alternatively, one may argue that imposing higher discount rates may delay or deter valuable
investments, potentially causing under-investment. While we cannot completely rule out this
possibility, we believe that it is less a concern. Throughout our empirical analysis, we control
for investment opportunities and other firm-specific variables, and thus systematic differences
in discount rates most likely reflect the effects of institutions. Moreover, given that over-
investment and in turn over-capacity have been the primary structural problems challenging
the Chinese economy, little anecdotal and empirical evidence shows that under-investment
is a pervasive concern in the absence of external financing constraints.
We estimate our investment Euler equation using generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimators. A key advantage of this approach is that it avoids sample selection, simultaneity,
and measurement error biases via structural estimation with a large dataset. Using actual
2The difference between SOEs’ and other types of firms’ discount rates, θ, may also capture the effects of
factors other than institutional deficiencies on corporate investment, e.g., irrational decision making by firm
managers, etc. However, these factors are likely to be firm-specific and their effects likely average out when
aggregating.
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corporate investment data retrieved from a well-maintained dataset developed by the
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), we apply GMM estimators to a panel of
36,103 industrial firms from 2000 to 2005. We parameterize the stochastic discount factor as
a linear function of variables measuring institutions and firm-specific characteristics. Based
on the estimated structural parameter values, we compute the “implied” return on capital or
discount rate and examine its distribution. The estimates of our model yield several principal
findings. First, we find that the inferred discount rate varies significantly across ownership.
In our benchmark estimation, the inferred return on capital for a private firm, a Hong Kong,
Macao, or Taiwan invested firm (HK/TW firm), a foreign firm, a mixed firm (i.e., joint stock
firm), and a collective firm is respectively 9.4, 11.9. 10, 13, and 11.4 percentage points higher
than that of an otherwise equal SOE. Second, we find that the ownership effect is robust
to controlling or industries and the level of regional institutions and financial development,
indicating that ownership is the primary institutional factor affecting corporate investment
in China.
To shed further light on the effects of institutions on corporate investment, we apply the
same GMM estimators to another two samples of Chinese firms, the SOEs that were partially
privatized during our sample period and the universe of Chinese listed firms. Firms in these
two samples are less subject to external financing constraints and a positive θ is more likely
to be driven by institutions rather than financing constraints. Our GMM estimations on the
two samples yield very similar results. In particular, we find that an SOE tends to use a
higher discount rate to invest after it has changed its ownership status from SOE to mixed.
We also find that all else being equal, a state-control listed firm has an implied return on
capital that is 15.8 percentage points lower than that of an otherwise equal listed firm. In
addition, we provide evidence that firms with a larger fraction of outside board members,
firms with more shares held by a controlling shareholder, and firms with H– or B– shares
traded by foreign investors have a higher return on capital. Well-governed firms in China
are more cautious about investment and are less subject to the over-investment problem.
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Overall, we contribute to the literature on corporate investment and institutions.
Different from Dwenter and Malatesta (2001), Love (2003), and Wurgler (2000), we focus
on a single country and use more detailed firm-level data, which allows us to construct a
richer set of variables in examining the factors affecting corporate investment and to better
control for potential contamination due to cross-country differences. Moreover, we study the
case of China, which is of particular interest not only because of its size, but also because
it is an obvious outlier in most cross-country studies on the relation between institutions
and economic performance. While fixed asset investment remains one of the most significant
pillars of China’s economic growth, little research examines corporate investment and the
underlying economic and institutional factors that shape corporate investment behavior.
Deriving firm level returns on capital from actual capital expenditures and mapping out
their various cross-sections help us better understand corporate investment in China.
We also contribute to a small but growing literature on investment efficiency and resource
mis-allocation in China. Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) use aggregate data to estimate return
to capital in China. However, using aggregate data cannot directly measure the extent of
capital mis-allocation and link corporate investment behavior to institutional factors. Hsieh
and Klenow (2007) provide evidence of sizable gaps in the returns to capital across firms
within the same sectors in China and India compared to the U.S. But they do not investigate
systematically how the mis-allocation of capital is related to institutions. Dollar and Wei
(2007) examine how institutions such as ownership and regional economic development affect
corporate investment efficiency. But they use reduced-form model specifications based on
a small sample of survey data, and their measure of investment efficiency — the observed
average revenue product of capital — captures operating performance rather than ex ante
managerial investment propensity. Moreover, to argue that institutions enhance investment
efficiency at the micro level requires identifying firms that “should” be growing given their
investment opportunities.
We additionally contribute to the investment Euler equation literature (see, e.g.,
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Whited, 1992; Forbes, 2007; Love, 2003; Chirinko and Schaller, 2004; and Whited and
Wu, 2006) and to the investment-based asset pricing literature, which explains the cross-
section of expected stock returns or costs of equity from the perspective of value-maximizing
firms (see, e.g., Cochrane, 1991; Zhang, 2005; and Liu, Whited, and Zhang, 2009). Liu,
Whited, and Zhang (2009) use investment Euler equations to derive cross-sectional expected
stock returns, which are essentially levered investment returns tied to firm characteristics.
Our use of investment Euler equations focuses instead on the effects of institutional variables
on corporate investment via the discount rates perceived by firm managers. Our paper thus
is similar in spirit to Kang, Liu, and Qi (2010), who apply an investment Euler equation
framework to examine how government regulations (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) affect firm
investment in the U.S.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional background
in China and related literature, and presents four hypotheses on the potential effects of
China-specific institutions on corporate investment. Section 3 provides an investment model
and describes our estimation strategy. Section 4 discusses the data and variables used in our
empirical analysis. In Section 5, we discuss the effect of ownership on corporate investment,
and in Section 6 we estimate our model for the privatized SOEs and the Chinese listed firms,
respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Institutional Background and Corporate Investment
in China
China’s striking economic growth over the past three decades has been driven largely by
fixed asset investment. As evidenced by the most recent global economic crisis, when China’s
exports experienced a significant drop as a result of weak demand in the developed economies,
investment became the single most important pillar to sustain China’s growth. Two distinct
features characterize fixed asset investment during China’s reform era. First, the rate of
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fixed asset investment has hovered at a high level, partly due to a high domestic savings
ratio and China’s success in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). As shown in Table
A1, fixed asset investment accounts for nearly 50% of China’s GDP, which from time to time
raises the concern that the Chinese economy is overheating due to over-investment. Second,
as shown in Table A2, more than 50% of fixed asset investment concentrates in the state
sector or the quasi-state sector, where productivity and investment efficiency are believed to
be considerably low.
The excessive amount of capital allocated to the state sector results in widespread
inefficiency among SOEs, reduced overall productivity of the economy, and a large amount
of non-performing loans.3 Prior literature has identified several sources of inefficiency in
corporate investment, and attributes these sources to insufficient or weak institutions and
inefficient financial intermediation. First, during the reform era, China can be described
as a de facto federalism, with local governments having significant autonomy in economic
matters (Qian and Xu, 1993). Local bureaucrats are assessed and promoted primarily based
on local economic growth driven by investment. Returns generated by investment help pay
for social spending on everything from education to health care — costs that are now the
local governments’ responsibility. Local officials therefore have strong incentives to approve
new projects to stimulate economic growth. A large number of such investments have been
labeled “image” projects (projects undertaken by local governments to boost their local
image) or “political achievement” projects (projects undertaken to boost local bureaucrats’
scores on key performance indicators), and inherently suffer from dim earnings prospects.
From time to time, the central government has to take a slew of measures such as raising
bank lending rate and/or bank reserve requirements, and sometimes outright administrative
methods to put the brakes on investment boom to ensure that overheated investment does
not lead to inflation and a pile-up of bad loans.4
3As Farrell et al. (2006) show, during the first half of the 1990s, $3.30 of investment was needed to produce
$1.00 of GDP growth in China. Since 2001, $1.00 of GDP growth has required $4.90 of new investment —
40% higher than the amount required in South Korea and Japan during their higher-growth periods.
4One recent example occurred in August 2006, when the governor of Inner Mongolia and his two
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Second, the state-dominated financial system in China has systematically allocated
capital away from more productive sectors/regions toward less effective sectors/regions (see,
e.g., Young, 2001; Brandt and Li, 2003; Cull and Xu, 2003; and Boyreau-Debray and
Wei, 2005). Because of their soft budget constraints, SOEs are aﬄicted with a pervasive
“investment hunger” problem and are prone to over-investing regardless of the demand for
their products (Kornai, 1980). Legally and financially, inefficient SOEs are favored at the
expense of more efficient non-state sectors (Huang, 2003).
Despite numerous anecdotes and sound economic intuition, it remains empirically difficult
to map out the dynamic relation between corporate investment and institutions. In this paper
we propose a new empirical approach and provide direct evidence on Chinese firms’ corporate
investment. Using actual corporate investment data, we estimate investment Euler equations
that characterize Chinese firms’ investment behavior to derive the effective discount rate
perceived by firm managers in making investment spending decisions. This implied return
on capital is similar to the managerial hurdle rate, and is potentially a function of variables
measuring institutions.
The soft budget constraints aﬄicting SOEs and the fact that local governments act as
decision makers suggest that SOEs may demonstrate stronger investment propensity and
hence adopt lower discount rates: SOEs are favored by the state (e.g., they are less subject
to regulatory burdens, insecure property rights, and credit constraints), and thus they are
likely to perceive lower costs of capital. Non-state sectors, in contrast, are exposed to a
variety of institutional constraints, and are more likely to adopt higher hurdle rates to make
investment. Using the notation introduced earlier, we therefore argue that rSOE is a distorted
reflection of the market price of capital, in particular, it tends to be lower than the market
rate, and that the gap between rSOE and r is likely to be positive and persistent. We thus
lieutenants were publicly criticized by the State Council for disobeying the central government’s call to
slow investment by allowing hundreds of millions of dollars of investment in coal-burning power plants.
This investment boosted local economic growth but has been associated with ever-worsening environmental
problems in the northern part of China, several fatal accidents, and low efficiency (source: the Wall Street
Journal - Asia Edition, August 18, 2006).
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have the following hypothesis:
H1: The implied return on capital derived from actual investment is lower for SOEs and
higher for non-state firms (i.e., collective firms, private firms, HK/TW firms, and foreign
firms.)
We next conjecture that product market competition affects corporate investment
behavior as well. Intuitively, firms in a more competitive market likely face greater pressure
from their rivals and hence are more cautious in making investment decisions. The impact
of competition on corporate investment could be much more involved, however. Taking into
account the fact that firms’ options exercise strategies are formed strategically as part of a
Nash equilibrium (i.e., are not formulated in isolation), several studies (e.g., Grenadier, 1996,
2002; and Williams, 1993) show that an increase in competition leads to earlier exercise of
options. In the context of real-world corporate investment, the playing of a strategic exercise
game implies that an increase in competition may actually speed up investment.5 We thus
expect a negative effect of competition on discount rates.
In addition, given significant cross-regional variation in the quality of institutions, we
expect the implied return on capital to be higher for firms located in regions with better
institutions and a more market-oriented financial system.6 Combining the competition and
regional institution factors, we have:
H2: The implied return on capital derived from actual investment is higher for firms operating
in a less competitive market and for firms located in regions with better institutions and a
more market-oriented financial system.
Note that a caution has to be taken here because both competition and regional
institutions are highly correlated with the presence of state ownership. Their effects on
implied return on capital may therefore be camouflaged by the ownership effect.
5We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this explanation and its ensuing insight.
6Using Italian data, Guiso, Sapiegza, and Zingales (2004) document that local financial development
enhances the probability that an individual starts his own business, favors entry of new firms, increases
competition, and promotes growth. Local financial development is an important determinant of the economic
success of an area.
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If institutions affect corporate investment, firms’ investment decisions should be different
once the institutions concerning firms have been improved. The on-going privatization wave
in China provides us with an opportunity to examine how changes in institutions affect
corporate investment decisions. Converting SOEs to joint stock companies (i.e., mixed-
ownership companies) has been the common privatization route in China. The conversion
may takes many forms. Selling part of the shares to non-state shareholders and even the
public via initial public offerings (IPOs) is the common practice. We conjecture that an
SOE’s investment will be improved after it changes its ownership status from SOE to mixed.
We have:
H3: The SOEs’ implied return on capital increases after they have been partially privatized.
While we argue that the sign and magnitude of θ capture differences in corporate
investment caused by institutional deficiencies, a positive θ may also result from a high
level of financing constraints faced by non-state firms simply because these firms are not
favored by the state-dominated financial system. Testing H3 above may help to disentangle
the impact of external financing constraints from the impact of institutions because the
majority of privatized SOEs are still state controlled.
In the same vein, we apply the same estimators to the universe of China’s listed firms,
among which external financing constraints are less severe. We expect that all else being
equal, firms with better corporate governance tend to be more cautious about investment.
Evidence from the sample of Chinese listed firms should more likely reflect differences in
corporate investment behavior caused by institutions. We have:
H4: All else being equal, the implied return on capital is higher for firms with better corporate
governance.
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3 Model and Estimation Strategy
To motivate our empirical work and provide guidance on the choice of control variables in the
estimation, we offer a simple partial-equilibrium model in which a firm manager maximizes
expected utility by choosing investment and consumption. We derive our investment Euler
equation from this simple model. We then outline the framework for our empirical analysis.
3.1 A Simple Model
Consider an infinitely lived firm i that uses capital to produce goods in each period t. The
firm manager maximizes the expected present discounted value of his utility over an infinite
horizon,
Vi0 = Ei0
[ ∞∑
t
βu(dit)
]
, (1)
where Ei0 is the expectations operator conditional on the manager’s time 0 information set;
β is the one-period discount factor common to all firms; u(.) is the manager’s utility function
(if the manager is risk-averse, the utility function is concave); and dit is the dividend paid
by firm i in period t.
The manager maximizes Equation (1) subject to two conditions. The first defines
dividends,
dit = Π(Kit, ζit)− C(Iit, Kit)− Iit, (2)
where Kit is the beginning-of-period capital stock; ζit is a shock to the profit function that
follows a Markov process and is observed by the firm at time t; Π(Kit, ζit) is the firm’s profit
function with ΠK ≡ ∂Π∂K > 0; Iit is investment during time t; and C(Iit, Kit) is the real cost
of adjusting the capital stock, with ∂C
∂I
> 0, ∂C
∂K
< 0, and ∂
2C
∂I2
> 0.
The second condition characterizes capital stock accumulation,
Kit+1 = (1− δi)Kit + Iit, (3)
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where δi is the firm-specific constant rate of economic depreciation.
The choice variables in this model are Iit and dit, and the state variable is Kit. Solving
the model yields the Euler condition for Kit:
1 + (
∂C
∂I
)it = Eit
[
β
u′(dit+1)
u′(dit)
{
(
∂Π
∂K
)it+1 − ( ∂C
∂K
)it+1 + (1− δi)(1 + (∂C
∂I
)it+1)
}]
, (4)
where ∂C
∂I
is the marginal adjustment cost of investment; β u
′(dit+1)
u′(dit)
is the marginal rate
of substitution of dividends, or the pricing kernel from a consumption-based asset pricing
model; and ∂Π
∂K
is the marginal profit of capital. For notational convenience, we define
Γit+1 ≡ β u′(dit+1)u′(dit) . We immediately rewrite Equation (4) as follows:
1 + (
∂C
∂I
)it = Eit
[
Γit+1
{
(
∂Π
∂K
)it+1 − ( ∂C
∂K
)it+1 + (1− δi)(1 + (∂C
∂I
)it+1)
}]
. (5)
The Euler equation in Equation (5) describes the evolution of the firm manager’s
investment decisions along the optimal path and has an intuitive interpretation. To decide
whether to invest in the current period versus in the next period, a manager must consider the
costs and benefits of the timing decision. This equation is simply a first-order condition that
describes the optimal intertemporal allocation of investment. The left-hand side represents
the marginal adjustment cost of investing in this period. The right-hand side represents
the expected discounted cost of deferring investment to next period, which consists of
the marginal product of capital and the marginal reduction in adjustment costs from an
increment to the capital stock. Notice that even if the firm waits, it still incurs adjustment
costs. Optimizing investment necessitates that, on the margin, the manager must be
indifferent between investing in the current period and transferring those resources to the
next period.
The factor Γit+1 in Equation (5) merits further discussion. By construction, Γit+1 is
the product of the discount factor common to all firms (β) and the ratio of the marginal
utility of dividends in the next period to the marginal utility of dividends in the current
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period. Because our investment Euler equation characterizes the optimal intertemporal
allocation of investment, Γit+1 is essentially the discount factor that the firm manager uses
to discount the investment returns in the next period. While Γit+1 is clearly related to the
manager’s preferences, it can be interpreted as the stochastic discount factor of the dynamic
utility optimization problem that guides the manager’s optimal investment choices. We can
accordingly define the stochastic discount rate rit as
rit =
1
Γit
− 1, (6)
where rit can be interpreted as the “perceived” hurdle rate the firm manager uses for optimal
investment. Note that if the firm manager is risk-averse and dividend growth is positive,
greater managerial risk aversion implies a higher discount rate (Cochrane, 2001, pp. 13-14).
3.2 Estimation
To estimate the model, we use the assumption of rational expectations to replace the
expectations operator in Equation (5) with an expectational error, eit+1, where Eit(eit+1) = 0
and Eit(e
2
it+1) = σ
2
it. The first condition suggests that eit+1 is uncorrelated with the
information available at time t, and the second implies that the expectational error can
be heteroskedastic. We can thus rewrite Equation (5) as
Γit+1
{
(
∂Π
∂K
)it+1 − ( ∂C
∂K
)it+1 + (1− δi)(1 + (∂C
∂I
)it+1)
}
= 1 + (
∂C
∂I
)it + eit+1. (7)
To parameterize the marginal product of capital, we follow Whited (1998) and Whited
and Wu (2006) and assume that firms are imperfectly competitive. We thus set the output
price as a constant markup, µ, over the marginal cost. In this case, constant returns to scale
implies
∂Π
∂K
(Kit, ζit) =
Yit − µV Cit
Kit
, (8)
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where Yit is output; µ is the markup; V Cit is variable cost; and Kit is capital stock.
Firms incur adjustment costs when investing. The adjustment cost function is increasing
and convex in Iit and decreasing in Kit. We use a standard quadratic function form to specify
the adjustment cost function, C(Iit, Kit), as follows:
7
C(Iit, Kit) = (
α
2
)(
Iit
Kit
)2Kit, (9)
where α is the adjustment cost parameter to be estimated.
Substituting Equation (8) into Equation (7), differentiating Equation (9) with respect
to Iit and Kit, and substituting the derivatives into Equation (7), we obtain the following
equation:
Γit+1
{
Yit+1 − µV Cit+1
Kit+1
+
α
2
(
Iit+1
Kit+1
)2 + (1− δi)(1 + α Iit+1
Kit+1
)
}
= 1 + α
Iit
Kit
+ eit+1. (10)
To estimate Equation (10), we need to specify the stochastic discount factor, Γit+1. As
Cochrane (2001) argues, all asset pricing models amount to different ways of connecting
the stochastic discount factor to data. There are many possible structural or reduced-form
parametrizations, expressing the stochastic discount factor as functions of state variables
such as consumption growth, aggregate wealth proxies, or data-driven factors. Opting for a
reduced-form specification, we specify Γit as a function of several firm-level characteristics
7In earlier versions of the paper, we use a more flexible function form and parameterize the adjustment cost
function as C(Iit,Kit) = (
∑M
m=2
1
mαm(
Iit
Kit
)m)Kit, where αm,m = 2, ...,M are coefficients to be estimated
and M is a truncation parameter that sets the highest power of IitKit in the expansion. We follow Whited and
Wu (2006) and set M = 3. Although including the cubic term in the adjustment cost function does yield
slightly better model performance (similar to the findings in Whited, 1998), we find that some adjustment
cost parameter estimates are negative and insignificant. We therefore opt for a quadratic adjustment cost
function throughout our empirical analysis. We are extremely grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting
us comparing different forms of the adjustment cost function.
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and institutional variables.8 We assume
Γit = l0 + l1OWNit + l2LNLABORit + l3HINDit + l4NERIit + l5TLTDit (11)
+bOWNit × LNLABORit,
Here OWNit is a set of dummy variables that specify a firm’s ownership identification;
LNLABORit is the natural logarithm of the number of employees, which captures firm size;
HINDit is the industry Herfindahl index, which is the sum of squared firm market shares
measured by sales in a given industry (based on the two-digit industry codes designated by
NBS); NERIit measures the quality of institutions and financial development in the region
in which a firm locates (see Section 4.3); and TLTD is the ratio of long-term liabilities to
total assets, which captures the impact of financing decisions on corporate investment.
An ad hoc parameterization of the stochastic discount factor provides empirical flexibility.
For example, we include OWN as a set of determinants, which translates the potential effects
of ownership on investment into differences in the stochastic discount factor across OWN .
Several issues arise in this reduced-form specification of the stochastic discount factor. First,
the parameterization in Equation (11) does not allow for an explicit error term, and hence
the specification could be incorrect. We test this assumption using J-test statistics of over-
identifying restrictions, which provide an important check on the model’s validity. Second,
the structural model provides no guidance as to which variables should be included in the
parameterization of the stochastic discount factor. To address this issue, we start with the
most general specification, and then drop variables that display low statistical significance,
and examine the difference between the minimized GMM objective functions of the two
8One caveat with respect to our specification is that it does not model traditional risk factors such as
β, book-to-market, and momentum, as the majority of our sample firms are not publicly listed. We defer a
more general specification of Γit to Section 6.2, where we analyze the universe of listed firms in China. We
are not particularly concerned about the omission of these factors here because (1) our estimations, as we
will explain later, are based on three-year investment data (2003 to 2005), and thus our results are driven
largely by cross-sectional variation rather than time-series variation; and (2) we include in the specification
a rich set of firm-specific variables that likely pick up these traditional risk factors.
16
models. The difference asymptotically follows a χ2 distribution with degrees of freedom
equal to the number of variables dropped from the more general model. If a variable belongs
in the parameterization of the stochastic discount factor, its omission should produce a low
p-value. We use Whited and Wu’s (2006) L-test to test these exclusion restrictions.
We estimate Equation (10), with Γit+1 parameterized as in Equation (11), in first
differences to eliminate possible fixed firm effects. We apply GMM to the moment conditions
Et−1[zit−1 ⊗ (eit+1 − eit)], (12)
where zit−1 is a vector of instrumental variables known at time t, and⊗ denotes the Kronecker
product. Because this estimator is implemented in first differences, the procedure calls for
using variables dated t − 2 as instruments. We thus use as instruments the two-period-
lagged variables that include all the variables that appear in our investment Euler equation
and several firm-specific variables. To account for potential macroeconomic shocks, we also
include time dummies.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section we discuss our data sources and the construction of our samples. We next
define the variables used in the empirical analysis and provide their summary statistics.
4.1 Data Sources
We primarily use a database developed and maintained by the National Bureau of Statistics
of China to conduct our empirical analysis. The NBS data are in fact census data. The
NBS surveys all industrial firms in China with sales above RMB5 million (approximately
US$735,000). The NBS database is constructed based on annual accounting briefing reports
filed by these industrial firms in China with the NBS. The database covers close to 190,000
firms in 37 2-digit manufacturing industries and from 31 provinces or province-equivalent
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municipal cities from 2000 to 2005. The NBS database represents literally all of China’s
industrial value added and 22% of China’s urban employment in 2005.9
The NBS designates every firm in the database a legal identification number and specifies
its ownership type. Firms are classified into one of the following six primary ownership
categories: SOEs, collective firms, private firms, mixed-ownership firms (mainly joint stock
companies), foreign firms, and Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan invested firms (HK/TW
firms). The NBS does not treat publicly listed companies in China separately. It is difficult
to track these firms as their legal identification numbers are changed when they go public.
But they all belong to the mixed ownership category. By 2005, there are about 1,400 publicly
listed companies in China’s two stock exchanges, of which only slightly over 800 are industrial
firms.
The NBS database contains detailed information that allows us to construct variables
required for GMM estimations of investment Euler equations. All monetary terms used in
our empirical analysis are in 2000 constant Renminbi (RMB) Yuan.
In addition to using the NBS database, we also conduct our empirical analysis using
the universe of China’s listed companies in Section 6.2. The listed firms’ financial data are
retrieved from the CSMAR Financial Databases developed by Shenzhen GTA Information
Technology Co. The sample period for this analysis is 1999 to 2005.
4.2 Sampling
To conduct GMM estimations, we need a balanced panel of firm-year observations. The
NBS dataset, however, has several built-in weaknesses. First, the firms included in the NBS
survey each year are not always the same. About 20% of firms enter or exit the database each
year as a result of changes in their size classification or in their identification numbers due to
mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcies, or restructuring. Although the original NBS database
contains industrial firms with numbers ranging from 162,883 to 279,092 over 2000 to 2005,
9A few studies on China use this database. See, e.g., Li et al. (2009) and Cai and Liu (2009).
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only 40,217 of these firms appear every year. Second, because NBS chooses to include in
the database any industrial firm with annual sales above RMB 5 million, many firms are
fairly small. One may wonder whether those relatively small firms represent corporate China
well. Third, the NBS dataset does not have information on capital expenditures or firm-level
fixed asset investment. We thus have to compute fixed asset investment, Iit, according to
the investment accounting identity. However, not all the information required to calculate
Iit is available for all firms in the data.
Given the above considerations, our sampling process includes in our sample those firms
with data entries every year from 2000 to 2005. We delete firms with extreme variable
values (1% at both tails). Our final sample contains 36,103 firms from 2000 to 2005. In
2005, these firms account for approximately 55% of total industrial value added and 12% of
urban employment in China.
Table 1 reports the ownership and industry breakdowns of our sample firms. As shown
in Panel A, SOEs, collective firms, mixed firms, private firms, HK/TW firms, and foreign
firms respectively account for 13.29%, 14.09%, 20.93%, 21.54%, 15.18%, and 14.97% of our
sample. Panel B shows the industry breakdown. The textile (17), electrical machinery and
equipment (39), ordinary machinery (35), nonmetal products (31), and raw chemical (26)
industries are the five largest industries in our final sample, while petroleum and natural gas
extraction (7) and ferrous mining (8) are the least covered industries.10 Table A3 presents
the distribution by region. Guangdong, Zhejian, and Jiangsu are the three provinces with
the largest numbers of firms, while Hainan, Tibet, Qinghai, and Ningxia have the fewest
firms.
We note that our sampling process unavoidably introduces selection bias or survival bias.
This concern is greatly mitigated however by the following considerations. First, most firms
excluded from our sample are fairly small and young. Arguably, these firms do not capture
the true picture of the Chinese industrial firms. Second, the ownership, industry, and region
10Numbers in brackets are the 2-digit industry codes designated by NBS.
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breakdowns of our sample firms are largely in line with those of the original NBS data. In
addition, during the sampling process, we do not observe any significant cross-ownership,
cross-industry, or cross-region patterns in the probability of an observation being dropped.
Third, we conduct several robustness checks and find results very similar to those based on
our final sample.11
4.3 Variables
We first construct six dummy variables to capture a firm’s ownership status, respectively,
DSOE, Dprivate, Dforeign, DHK/TW , Dmixed, and Dcollective. These binary variables take the
value of one if a firm falls into a corresponding ownership category and zero otherwise.
We measure firm i’s output in year t by its sales, Saleit . Cost, V Cit, is the sum of the
costs of goods sold and administrative costs. We denote total assets as TAit. We divide
both Saleit and V Cit by total assets. The depreciation rate, DRATEit, is computed as the
ratio of DEPit (current year depreciation) to beginning-of-year fixed assets, Kit−1.12 Cash
flow, CFKit, is defined as earnings before depreciation and amortization. We retrieve total
long-term liabilities, TLTDit, and current assets, CAit, from the NBS data. Besides the
above variables, we use INV ENit to denote firm i’s total inventories in year t. The firm’s
after tax income is defined as INCOMEit, which is scaled by total sales. The effective tax
rate, TAXit, is calculated as the ratio of total income tax to total before-tax profit. We
use the natural logarithm of the number of employees, LNLABORit, to measure firm size.
Except for INCOMEit, DRATEit, and TAit, all of the variables are scaled by total assets
(TAit). We also define firm age as AGEit. As discussed in Section 3.2, the industry-level
Herfindahl index, HINDit, is defined to capture the level of competitiveness of an industry.
11We conduct GMM estimations for several sub-samples. We first impose a size restriction and only
include in our sample large-sized firms, that is, firms with total assets and total sales both above RMB 20
million. The estimation results are qualitatively similar. We also apply the estimation to the population of
the publicly listed companies in China and again find qualitatively similar results (see Section 6.2). Thus, a
selection bias, if any, likely affects the economic magnitude of our results but not their direction.
12We delete firms with DRATEit larger than one from our sample. About 0.4% of firms are thus dropped.
Such a screening rule is consistent with our previously discussed guideline that firms with extreme variable
values are excluded.
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China is a large and diversified country with significant regional differences in institutions
and financial development (Demurger et al., 2002). China can be also described as a de facto
federalism, involving a decentralized economic system in which each region can be considered
an autonomous economic entity (Qian and Xu, 1993). Domestic financial markets in China
are severely segmented — compared with developed markets, cross-region bank lending has
been relatively rare (Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). We use NERI, compiled by Fan and
Wang (2004), to control for cross-regional differences in institutions.13
The NBS dataset contains information on firm-level fixed assets (Kit) and depreciations
(DEPit), which enables us to compute Iit by the investment accounting identity
Iit = Kit −Kit−1 +DEPit. (13)
Since we do not have information on fixed assets in 1999, we can only compute Iit for the
2001 to 2005 period. To apply GMM estimations, we have to use variable values lagged by
two periods as the instruments. We thus can only estimate investment Euler equations for
2003 to 2005. Panel A of Table 2 presents firms’ investment rate (Iit/TAit) by ownership
type from 2003 to 2005. Judged by firms’ investment rate, private firms in China invest
more than other types of firms in China, with average investment rate of 17.7%. However,
the numbers reported in Panel A of Table 2 might be misleading because they do not take
into account the effects of firm size and investment opportunities. SOEs in China have a
longer history and are usually larger than private firms and collective firms, but they do not
necessarily have better investment opportunities.
To shed light on the extent to which corporate investment behavior in China varies
across ownership, we regress the firm-level investment rate on ownership dummies and firm
13Fan and Wang (2004) examine the extent of marketization in each region by focusing on the following
five factors: (1) the relation between the local government and local markets; (2) the significance of the non-
state sector in the local economy; (3) the development level of product markets; (4) the development level of
factor markets; and (5) legal environment, law enforcement, and the development of market intermediaries.
The weighted average of the scores on these five factors is computed and used to capture the market and
legal conditions of China’s diverse regions.
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size. Panel B of Table 2 reports the OLS regression results, where SOEs are used as the
benchmark. In Model 1, only ownership dummies are included as the explanatory variables.
The results verify the finding in Panel A — relative to SOEs, non-state sectors in China
invest more, as all ownership dummies are significantly positive. In Model 2, we control
for firm size by including LNLABOR. We document similar results. Note that firm size
enters the regression positively, implying that larger firms tend to invest more. One may
therefore wonder whether ownership variables affect corporate investment via firm size. In
model 3, we add to the regression interactions between ownership variables and firm size,
LNLABOR. We find that both the statistical and economic magnitudes of the ownership
dummies are greatly attenuated. This finding suggests that after controlling for firm size,
non-state sectors in China do not necessarily invest more. Using the investment rate to
understand Chinese firms’ investment behavior might thus be misleading.
In Table 3, we present the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis.
During 2001 to 2005, fixed asset investment on average accounts for 14.9% of total assets;
the average depreciation rate (DRATE) for our sample firms is 17.2%; and cash flow is
about 3.4% of total assets (CFK). The mean of ST , which is the ratio of total sales to total
assets, is 1.274. The sales costs (V C), which is defined as the total sales costs over total
assets is 109.4%. The profit rate (INCOME), defined as after-tax profit over total sales, has
a mean of 2.7%. The average firm age for our sample firms is 16.1 years, and an average firm
has 500 employees (the mean of the natural logarithm of the number of employees is 5.35).
In addition to the above variables, Table 3 also reports summary statistics for inventories
over total assets (INV EN), income tax over total assets (TAX), current assets over total
assets (CA), industry Herfindahl index (HIND), regional institutions (NERI), and long-
term liabilities over total assets (TLTD). Their means are, respectively, 18.1%, 0.9%, 3.1%,
0.011, 6.29, and 6.4%.
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5 The Effects of Ownership on Corporate Investment
This section presents estimates of our GMM estimation for our sample consisting of 36,103
Chinese industrial firms. It also offers GMM estimates for several sub-samples.
5.1 The Baseline Model
We apply GMM estimations to various Euler equations. We start with the model specified
in Equations (10) and (11), to examine the effect of ownership on corporate investment. As
shown in Equation (11), the marginal effect of ownership on Γit is given by
∂Γit
∂OWNit
= l1 + bLNLABORit. (14)
In all of our estimations, SOEs are used as the benchmark, that is, we assume the
coefficient of DSOE to be 0. In Equation (14), the constant l1 captures the effect of ownership
variables on the stochastic discount factor that is unrelated to firm size, and b×LNLABOR
measures the effect of ownership on the stochastic discount fact via firm size. Plugging
Γit given by Equation (11) into Equation (12) and using GMM estimations, we expect the
estimated coefficients of l1 and b to be negative and positive, respectively.
We start with the most general specification of the stochastic discount factor, in which
ownership dummies, their interactions with firm size, and various firm–, industry–, and
region–level variables are used to parameterize Γit. Together with the two unknown
parameters in the production function and investment adjustment function (µ, and α),
we have a total of 16 parameters to estimate.14 Our instruments include all of the Euler
equation variables lagged by two periods such as Saleit−2, V Cit−2, DRATEit−2, and Iit−2, as
well as inventories (INV ENit−2), long-term liabilities (TLTDit−2), current assets (CAit−2),
the tax rate (TAXit−2), firm size (LNLABORit−2), net income (INCOMEit−2), cash flow
(CFKit−2), firm age (AGEit−2), industry-level Herfindahl index (HINDit−2), ownership
14Note that the coefficients of the SOE dummy and its interaction with LNLABOR have been set to zero.
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dummies, two time dummies (years 2003 and 2004), and finally the constant. There are in
total 22 instruments.
Table 4 presents the GMM estimates. Column (1) reports estimates from the most general
model, where the discount factor is specified according to Equation (11).15 Each subsequent
column contains GMM estimates from a model in which the variables with the smallest t-
statistics are dropped from the stochastic discount function. We examine the difference in
the minimized GMM objective functions for the most general and for the subsequently more
parsimonious models. Each of these differences will have a χ2 distribution with degrees of
freedom equal to the number of variables excluded from the model. If a variable should be
included, its omission should produce a small p-value.
Note that of the five models in Table 4, the J-tests of over-identifying restrictions do
not reject these restrictions except for the model in Column (5). This finding is particularly
important in light of the deterministic specification of Equation (11). If this equation were to
have an error term, the covariance between its error term and the remainder of the left side
of Equation (10) would be implicitly included in eit+1, and would violate the over-identifying
restrictions (see Whited and Wu (2006) for details). The fact that the model in Column
(5) fails to pass the J-test indicates that the interactions between ownership dummies and
LNLABOR should be included in the discount factor function. The ownership variables
also affect the stochastic discount factor via the firm size channel.
The results of the most general model, where firm size, ownership dummies, their
interactions with firm size, the industry-level Herfindahl index (HIND), the regional
institution variable (NERI), and the ratio of long-term liabilities to total assets (TLTD)
are used to parameterize the discount factor, show that HIND, NERI, and TLTD are
not statistically significant with TLTD having the smallest t-statistic. The results from
the model without TLTD are reported in Column (2). Whited and Wu’s (2006) L-test
15We actually start with discount factor functions that contain more firm-level variables than Equation (11)
does. The majority of those model specifications are not statistically significant. Including more variables
in the discount factor function also significantly increases the demand for instrument variables and reduces
the stability of the estimation results.
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suggests that dropping TLTD should not affect the performance of the model. Column
(3) reports the results from the model that also drops NERI. The result of the L-test
of exclusion restrictions again suggests that NERI should not be included in the discount
factor function. In Column (4), we report the GMM estimates from the model in which
HIND is also excluded from the discount factor function, and Whited and Wu’s (2006)
L-test suggests that HIND should be included in the Euler equation model (the p-value of
the L-test is 0.066). The model in Column (3) has the best overall performance. We thus
treat this model as our benchmark model in the empirical analysis.
The GMM estimates reported in Table 4, especially those in Column (3), reveal several
findings. The estimated coefficients of Dprivate, Dcollective, Dmixed, Dforeign, and DHK/TW are
all significantly negative, and the estimated coefficients of their interactions with LNLABOR
are all significantly positive. Since the effect of ownership on the discount factors perceived
by managers is given by Equation (14), we plug the sample mean of LNLABOR, 5.35, and
estimated coefficients back into this equation to compute the ownership effect. We find that
everything else being equal, an average non-state firm has a discount factor that is smaller
than that of an average SOE. That is, managers of non-state firms tend to perceive a lower
implied discount factor. Equivalently, they perceive a higher implied return on capital. This
finding applies to all models in Columns (1)-(4).
We also find that the measure of competitiveness, HIND, is significantly negative,
suggesting that firms in more competitive industries, as indicated by a lower level of HIND,
have a higher (lower) discount factor (discount rate). That is, firms in more competitive
industries tend to adopt lower hurdle rates to make investment. This result is consistent
with the analytical finding in Grenadier (1996, 2002) and Williams (1993) that firms in
more competitive industries may speed up investment so that they can enjoy a first-mover
advantage. The estimated coefficient of LNLABOR is significantly negative in all models,
implying that larger firms tend to have a lower (higher) discount factor (implied return
on capital) than smaller firms. Larger firms tend to be more cautious about corporate
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investment after controlling for investment opportunities, competition, and the effects of
other firm-specific attributes.
We now examine the economic magnitude of the ownership effect according to the
estimates reported in Column (3). We compute the effect of ownership on the implied
return on capital using Equation (14). The mean of LNLABOR in our sample is 5.35. Now
consider the case of the private firms. All else being equal, a private firm’s effective discount
factor is 9.4 percentage points lower than that of a typical SOE.16 Similarly, we can compute
the magnitude of the ownership effect for mixed firms, collective firms, foreign firms, and
HK/TW firms. Our computation indicates that the perceived or implied return on capital
for collective firms, mixed firms, HK/TW firms, and foreign firms is approximately 11.4, 13,
11.9, and 10 percentage points higher than that of an average SOE.
As shown in Table 4, the adjustment cost parameter, α, is positive and statistically
significant. Nonetheless, understanding the economic magnitude of the adjustment cost
parameters is difficult. The literature does not provide a convincing standard for comparison,
especially in the case of China. In addition, our 3-year panel may not be long enough to
identify the discount factor parameters and adjustment cost parameters at the same time.
Furthermore, firms may react sluggishly to an investment, in which case a relatively short
panel makes it difficult to obtain precise estimate of the adjustment cost parameter. A
caution therefore should be taken on the magnitude of α.
The results in Table 4 show that on average non-state firms in China are more cautious
about corporate investment than are SOEs. Given that over-investment has been a
widespread phenomenon and has concerned policy makers (see our discussion in Section 1),
a more cautious attitude toward investment may work against over-investment and thus be
value-enhancing. In this regard, we interpret the use of higher discount rates in making
investment decisions as an indicator of more efficient investment. It is worth noting that
16The estimated coefficients of the private firm dummy and its interaction with LNLABOR are
respectively – 1.175 and 0.202. The aggregate impact of the private firm dummy on the effective discount
factor is thus −1.175 + 0.202× 5.35 = −0.094.
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the higher discount rates that non-state firms use to discount future investment payoffs may
reflect financing constraints. We believe that the higher discount rates perceived by non-
state firms are largely driven by institutional deficiencies. First, as shown in Table 4, the
mixed firms also perceive higher discount rates. The majority of mixed firms are controlled
by the state and can be viewed as de facto SOEs. Their access to external finance can thus
be expected to be at least as good as that of the SOEs. In addition, all of our sample firms
are above scale firms and have high visibility. In an unreported analysis, we find that there
is no significant difference in firm leverage ratio by ownership. Finally, in Section 6, we
analyze the privatized SOEs and the Chinese listed firms, which are less subject to external
financing constraints, and find similar results. In sum, our evidence suggests that while the
state-dominated financial system in China greatly favors SOEs, it is unlikely the driver of a
positive θ.
To better visualize the effect of ownership on corporate investment, we estimate the
perceived discount rate for each firm by plugging the relevant variable values into the
stochastic discount factor equation, according to the model specification in Column (3)
of Table 4. We assume that the average discount rate for all firms in our sample is 10%
over 2001 to 2005.17 This assumption allows us to estimate the value of the constant term
l0, which is 1.904 for our sample. Based on the estimated coefficients, we compute the
investment-based discount rate for each firm-year observation. Because the discount rates
are inferred from the estimated discount factor equation and are tied to firm characteristics,
there are many outliers. To better understand how ownership affects the investment behavior
of average Chinese firms, we eliminate observations with extreme discount rate values from
our analysis. Specifically, for each year, we delete firms with discount rates smaller than the
1st percentile or larger than the 99th percentile. For the remaining firms, we calculate yearly
averages. Figure 1 plots these yearly averages. The figure shows that on average the SOEs
17This assumption is an innocuous one. Using different average discount rates would change the magnitude
of the inferred discount rates, but would not change the relative patterns in the dynamics of the inferred
discount rates.
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have the lowest return on capital.
5.2 The Industry Analysis
Our analysis in Section 5.1 does not fully control for the potential effects of industries.
Although we include the Herfindahl index at the two-digit industry level (HIND), HIND
is arguably an imperfect measure of industry effects. In addition, we assume that the firms
from different industries face the same profit function and cost adjustment function, and
that the cross-sectional variation in their investment behavior is totally driven by firm-level
discount factors. These assumptions are restrictive. To check whether the empirical evidence
reported in Section 5.1 is sensitive to these assumptions, we conduct additional empirical
analysis below.18
We apply GMM estimations to the five largest industries (by number of firms) in our
sample. These industries are: textile (2,738; 7.58%), raw chemical (2,646; 7.33%), nonmetal
products (2,899; 8.03%), ordinary machinery (2,763; 7.65%), and electrical machinery (3,218;
8.91%), where the first number in parentheses refers to the number of unique firms in each
industry and the second number refers to this industry’s share of the full sample. These
five industries together account for 40% of our sample. We estimate the model specified in
Column (4) of Table 4 for each of these five industries and report the estimation results in
Columns (1)–(5) of Table 5.19
The results from Table 5 reveal several findings. First, for each industry, the
estimated coefficients of the ownership dummies and their interactions with LNLABOR
have the expected signs and in most cases are statistically significant. We compute the
ownership effects by plugging the estimated coefficients and the means of LNLABOR into
Equation (14), and find that in all five industries the non-state firms’ managerial perceived
18For this part of analysis, we do not include the two time dummies (years 2003 and 2004) as instruments
because our GMM estimations fail to converge for several industries. The total number of instruments thus
is 20.
19Note that we do not estimate the benchmark model as reported in Column (3) of Table 4 because we
do not want to include HIND in the discount factor function.
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discount rates are significantly greater than those of the SOEs. Second, the estimated
parameters of the profit and cost adjustment functions are quite different across the five
industries, suggesting that firms in different industries do indeed face different investment
opportunities.
In Column (6), we estimate our investment Euler equation for the whole sample, in
which we include the 37 2-digit industry dummies in the discount factor function Γit. This
specification directly controls for the industrial effects on the discount factor. Compared to
models in Columns (1) to (5), this model assumes that firms from different industries face the
same investment opportunities and hence share the same profit and cost functions. We use
GMM to estimate the model. Besides the 20 instruments described before, we also include
the industry dummies as instruments. The degrees of freedom is still 7. The J-test shows
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the model is correctly specified. We are interested
in the signs and significance levels of the ownership dummies and their interactions with
LNLABOR. After we include the industry dummies in Γit, non-state firms still demonstrate
distinct investment behavior. For example, plugging the estimated coefficients and the mean
of LNLABOR into Equation (14), we find that all else being equal, an average private
firm has an implied return on capital that is 12.1 percentage points higher than that of an
average SOE. This magnitude is slightly larger than that reported in Table 4, where industry
dummies are not included. Overall, the results in Table 5 show that the ownership effects
identified earlier are robust to industry effects.
5.3 Evidence from Domestic Firms
Foreign firms and Hong Kong/Taiwan invested firms operating in China use financing
channels different from domestic firms. Arguably, their investment decision making process
may also differ from that of domestic firms. One may wonder whether pooling domestic firms
and foreign firms leads to spurious results. To shed more light on how institutions affect
Chinese firms’ investment decisions, as a robustness check we apply GMM estimations to a
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sub-sample consisting of 25,220 domestic firms in each year from 2001 to 2005. We replicate
the estimations in Table 4 and find qualitatively similar ownership effects. For brevity, we
do not report these results in the text.
6 Further Analysis
To offer more direct cross-checks on our empirical results, we apply the same approach
to another two samples of Chinese firms — the privatized SOEs (Section 6.1) and the
universe of publicly listed firms in China (Section 6.2). Such analysis has several incremental
advantages. First and foremost, both the privatized SOEs and the publicly listed firms in
China are less subject to external financing constraints. Estimating these firms allows us
to provide more clear-cut evidence on the extent of institutions on corporate investment.
Second, estimating privatized SOEs allows us to study how a firm’s investment behavior
changes after institutions concerning the firm have been improved. Third, in the case of
listed firms, they contain more publicly accessible information and the information is more
transparent and plausibly more reliable, which allows us to construct more variables to
capture the potential effects of institutions. Finally, the listed firms allow us to conduct
GMM estimations over a relatively longer time period, i.e., 1999 to 2005.
6.1 Estimating the Privatized Firms
We first examine the partially privatized SOEs from 2003 to 2005. In 2003, there are 4,799
SOEs in our sample. 500 of them subsequently changed their ownership status to mixed,
and 98 firms changed their ownership status to private. We expect the managers of those
firms to use higher discount rates when investing after they have been privatized.
We create two dummies MIX and Private, which take the value of 1 if an SOE becomes
a mixed firm or a private firms in either 2004 or 2005, and 0 otherwise. We start with the
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most general model, in which the discount factor function is specified as below:
Γit = l0 + l1MIXit + l2Privateit + l3LNLABORit + l4HINDit + l5NERIit (15)
+l6TLTD + b1MIXit ∗ LNLABORit + b2Privateit ∗ LNLABORit.
Applying the GMM estimation to Equations (10) and (15), we report the estimated
coefficients in Column (1) of Table 6. The model passes the J-test and reveals several
findings. First, the estimated coefficients of MIX and its interaction with LNLABOR are
statistically significant. However, the estimated coefficients of Private and its interaction
with LNLABOR are not, which might be due to the fact that few firms changed their
ownership status from SOE to private during 2003–2005. We thus exclude Private and its
interaction with LNLABOR from the discount factor function Γit in Column (2) of Table 6.
In Column (3), we further exclude MIX ×LNLABOR. The results from the L- tests show
that the model in Column (2) is correctly specified. The mean of LNLABOR for SOEs is 5.5,
and the impact of MIX on the effective discount factor is thus given by l1 + b1LNLABOR.
Plugging estimates of l1 and b1 and the mean of LNLABOR into the formula, we find that
all else being equal, a privatized firm has its discount factor decreased by 0.105. Putting it
in another way, its effective discount rate increases by roughly 10.5 percentage points.
Results reported in Column (2) of Table 6 yield several other interesting findings. The
estimate on the measure of industrial competition HIND is significantly negative, suggesting
that firms in more competitive industry tend to use lower discount rates. The estimates on
NERI and TLTD are both negative and statistically significant, suggests that all else being
equal SOEs located in regions with better institutions and more levered SOEs tend to use
higher discount rates when investing.
However, it is worth pointing out that this part of analysis is subject to a potential
sample selection bias. The same factors that lead to an SOE privatization may also affect
this particular firm’s investment decisions. Our estimation strategy cannot disentangle
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their impact from that of institutional improvement. The results from this part of analysis
therefore should be taken with a caution.
6.2 Estimating the Listed Firms in China
In this subsection, we examine the universe of China’s listed firms from 1999 to 2005.20 The
listed firms’ financial data are extracted from the CSMAR Financial Databases developed
by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Co. We obtain a sample of 5,977 firm-year
observations for our sample period, which represents 1,009 unique listed firms in China. To
make the estimation results comparable, we exclude firms in financial services and utilities.
We also delete firms with extreme variable values (1% at both tails). These filters leave us
with a panel of 646 firms in each year from 1999 to 2005.
To better capture the effects of institutions, we construct a rich set of corporate
governance variables and investigate how these variables affect the discount rates used by
listed firms to make investment. We define SOE as a binary variable that takes the value
of 1 if a listed firm is controlled by either the central government or a local government
and 0 otherwise. OUTSIDE is computed as the ratio of outside board members to total
board members. We define PARENT as a binary variable with the value of 1 if a listed
firm belongs to a group firm and 0 otherwise. TOPSHARE is the fraction of shares held
by the ultimate controlling shareholder. CEOCHAIR is a binary variable with the value of
1 if the CEO is also the board chairman. Some listed firms in China also have shares listed
and traded in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange; these shares are labeled ‘H’ shares. Further,
since late 1991, some listed firms have sold shares to foreign individuals and institutions;
these shares are labeled ‘B’ shares and are traded on the mainland Chinese stock exchanges
in a market that is separate from regular shares termed ‘A’ shares. We construct a dummy
variable HBSHARE that takes the value of 1 if a firm has H– or B–shares traded by foreign
investors and 0 otherwise. It has been argued that firms issuing either H– or B–shares to
20We start with 1999 because Chinese listed firms’ corporate governance variables are not available until
1999.
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foreign investors have a higher level of transparency and better overall corporate governance
practice (see, e.g., Bai et al., 2004).
With the above corporate governance variables in hand, we parameterize the discount
factor function Γit as follows:
Γit = l0 + l1SOEit + l2LNLABORit + l3OUTSIDEit + l4CFKit + l5HINDit + l6β (16)
+l7HBSHAREit + l8TOPSHARE + l9CEOCHAIR + l10PARENT + l11B/M,
where β is computed annually by using the CAPM model to capture systematic risk; B/M
is the book-to-market ratio; LNLABOR, CFK and HIND are defined as in our earlier
analysis.
We apply our GMM estimator to the listed firm sample and report the results in Table 7.
As can be seen in Table 7, the J-test of over-identifying restrictions fails to reject the validity
of this model. As for the parameter estimates, the estimated coefficient of the investment
adjustment cost function (α) are is positive and significant at the 10% level. Notably, Table 7
reveals several interesting findings about the roles played by corporate governance variables.
First, the estimated coefficient of SOE is significantly positive at 0.158. This suggests that
all else being equal, an SOE’s implied discount factor is approximately 15.8 percentage points
higher than that of other listed firms.
Second, we find that other corporate governance variables have expected signs and are
statistically significant in most cases. The listed firms with H– or B–shares traded by
foreign investors tend to be more cautious about investment. These firms are audited by
international accounting firms and hence are arguably more transparent compared to other
listed firms in China. We also find that firms with more outside board members use higher
discount rates in making investment decisions, suggesting that board independence affects
Chinese firms’ investment. Firms with more shares concentrated in the hands of controlling
shareholders also have higher implied returns on capital. When the controlling shareholders
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own more shares, their interests are more aligned with those of the firm, which may lead to
better decision making.
As for the other parameter estimates, we find that the estimated coefficient of β is
negative, but it is not significant. We also find that the estimated coefficient of the book-
to-market ratio is positive and insignificant. The estimated coefficients of CFK and HIND
are both insignificant. The effects of these variables on corporate investment may have been
picked up by other firm-level variables.
To summarize, the estimation results based on China’s listed firms generate consistent
findings — all else being equal, non-state firms in China are more cautious about investment
than state firms, and firms with better corporate governance (i.e., better institutions) are
more cautious about investment.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we use an investment Euler equation framework to assess the effects of
institutions on Chinese firms’ corporate investment decisions. We specify our investment
Euler equation in such a way that variables measuring institutions are allow to affect
the rate at which managers discount investment projects. The key insights of our Euler
equation framework are that the optimal level of firm investment is reached by trading off the
intertemporal costs and benefits of investment via an appropriate stochastic discount factor,
and that the stochastic discount factor is related to a utility-maximizing manager’s preference
for risk taking. We apply GMM to estimate the parameters of our investment Euler equation
and we infer managers’ implied discount rates from these estimated parameters.
We apply our empirical approach to several samples of Chinese firms. Our first sample
covers “above scale” Chinese industrial firms over the period 2001 to 2005. We document
robust evidence that the discount rates managers of Chinese firms apply vary significantly
across ownership types. All else being equal, non-state firms in China use a much higher
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discount rate to guiding their investment decisions than SOEs. We apply the same approach
to another two firm samples, the privatized SOEs in China and the universe of listed firms
in China. We provide evidence that an SOE uses a higher discount rate to invest after
privatization and that firms with better corporate governance use a higher discount rate to
make investment decisions.
Taking into account the fact that over-investment has been a widespread phenomenon in
China and also the fact that higher discount rates used by non-state firms are not entirely
due to the financing constraints faced by these firms, we interpret our empirical findings
as evidence supporting the argument that improving institutions helps impede widespread
over-investment and enhances firms’ investment efficiency. Our analysis thus suggests that
shifting capital from the state sector to the non-state sector is socially beneficial in China.
Our empirical findings have important policy implications. To cope with the adverse
impact of the global economic downturn on the Chinese economy, the Chinese government
has injected into the economy a large fiscal stimulus package. While this stimulus has
greatly boosted fixed asset investment and helped China maintain an impressive GDP growth
rate, our analysis shows that managing the allocation of capital to achieve more effective
investment remains a large challenge, and that solving this problem requires fundamental
improvement in China’s institutions.
35
References
[1] Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and J. Robinson, 2001. The colonial origins of comparative
edevelopment: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review 91(5), 1369-1401.
[2] Allen, F., J. Qian, and M. Qian, 2005. Law, finance, and economic Ggrowth in China.
Journal of Financial Economics, 77 (1), 57-116.
[3] Bai, C., Q. Liu, Z. Lu, F. Song, and J. Zhang, 2004. Corporate governance and firm
valuations. Journal of Comparative Economices, 32(4), 599-616.
[4] Bai, C., C. Hsieh, and Y. Qian, 2006. The return to capital in China, Brookings Papers
on Economic Activities, 61-88.
[5] Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, and R. Levine, 2003. Law, endownments, and finance.
Journal of Financial Economics, 70(2):137-181.
[6] Bekaert, G., C. Harvey, C. Lundblad, 2005. Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth.
Journal of Financial Economics 77, 3-56.
[7] Boyreau-Debray, G., S. Wei, 2005. Pitfalls of a state dominated financial system: the
case of China. NBER working paper.
[8] Brandt, L., and H. Li (2003). Bank discrimination in transition economies: ideology,
information, or incentives? Journal of Comparative Economics, 31: 387-413.
[9] Cai, H., Q. Liu, 2009. Competition and coproate tax avoidance: evidence form Chinese
industiral firms. The Economic Journal, 119, 764-795.
[10] Chirinko, R., H. Schaller, 2004. A revealed preference approach to understanding
corporate governance probelms: evidence from Canada. Journal of Financial Economics,
74: 181-206.
[11] Claessens, S., L. Laeven, 2003. Financial development, property rights, and gorwth.
Journal of Finance 58, 2401-2436.
[12] Cochrane, J., 2001. Asset Pricing. Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey.
[13] Cull, R., L.C. Xu, 2005. Instituions, ownership, and finance: the determinants of prifit
reinvestmetn among Chinese firms, Journal of Financial Economics, 77(1), 117-146.
[14] Demurger S., J.D. Sachs, W.T. Woo, S. Bao, and G. Chang, 2002. The relative
contributions of location and preferential policies in China’s regional development: being
in the right place and having the right incentives. China Econonic Review, 13: 444-465.
[15] Dewenter, K., and P. Malatesta, 2001. State-owned and privately owned firms: an
empirical analysis of profitability, leverage, and labor intensity, American Economic
Review, Vol. 91, No.1: 320-334.
36
[16] Dollar D., and S. Wei, 2007. Das (wasted) Kapital: firm ownership and investment
efficiency in China. NBER Working Paper 13103.
[17] Fan, G., and X.L. Wang, 2004. NERI index of marketization of China’s provinces.
Economics Science Press (In Chinese).
[18] Farrell, D., U. Gersch, and E. Stephenson, 2006. How financial-system reform could
benefit China? The McKisney Quarterly, 2006 special edition on Serving the new
Chinese Economy, 41–55.
[19] Forbes, K., 2007. One cost of the Chilean capital controls: increased financial constraints
for samller trade firms. Journal of International Economics, forthcoming.
[20] Gordon, R.H., and Wei Li, 2003. Government as a discriminating monopolist in the
financial market: the case of China. Journal of Public Economics 87, 283-312.
[21] Grenadier, S., 1996. The strategic exercise of options: development cascades adn
overbuilding in real estate markets. Journal of Finance, 51, 1653-1679.
[22] Grenadier, S., 2002. Option exercise games: an applicaiton to the equilibrium investment
strategies of firms. Review of Financial Studies, 15(3), 691-721.
[23] Guiso, L., P. Sapiegza, L. Zingales, 2004. Does local financial development matter?
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119: 929-969.
[24] Hsieh C., and P. Klenow, 2007. Misallocation and manufacturing TFP in China and
India. NBER Working Paper 13290.
[25] Huang, Y., 2003. Selling China: foreign direct investment during the reform era. The
Cambridge University Press.
[26] Kang, Q., Q. Liu, and R. Qi, 2010. The Sarbane-Oxley Act and corporate investment:
a structual assessment. Journal of Financial Economics, 96, 291-305.
[27] Kornai, J., 1980. The economics of shortage. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[28] Levine, R., and S. Zervos, 1998. Stock market, banks, and economic growth. American
Economic Review, Vol.88(3), 537-558.
[29] Li, K., H. Yue, L. Zhao, 2009, Ownership, institutions, and capital structure: evidence
from China. Journal of Comparative Economics, 37, 471-490.
[30] Liu, L., T. Whited, and L. Zhang, 2009. Investment-based expected stock returns.
Journal of Political Economy, 117, 1105-1139.
[31] Love, I., 2003. Financial development and financing constraints: International evidence
from the structural investment model. Review of Financial Studies, Vol.16 (3), 765-791.
[32] Newey, W., K. West, 1987. Hypothesis testing with efficient method of moments
estimation. International Economic Review, 28: 777-787.
37
[33] Qian, Y., and C. Xu, 1993. The M-form Hierarchy and China’s economic reform.
European Economic Review, 31, 541-548.
[34] Rajan, R., and L. Zingales, 1998. Financial dependence and growth. American Economic
Review, 88, 559-586.
5Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (4), 133-150.
[35] Whited, T., 1992. Debt, liquidity constraints, and coporate investment: evidence from
panel data. Journal of Finance, 47, 1425-1460.
[36] Whited, T., 1998. Why do investment Euler equations fail? Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics,16: 469-478.
[37] Whited, T., and G. Wu, 2006. Financing constraints risk. Review of Financial Studies,
19: 531-559.
[38] Williams, J., 1993. Equilibrium and options on real assets. Review of Financial Studies,
6, 825-850.
[39] Young, A., 2001. The razor’s edge: distortion and incremental reform in the People’s
republic of China. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
[40] Zhang, L., 2005. The value premium. Journal of Finance, 60, 67-103.
38
 39
Table 1 Ownership and Industry Breakdowns of Sample Firms 
The data source is a database compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics in China (NBS) 
that covers all industrial firms in China with total sales above RMB 5 million from 2000 to 
2005. We delete the firms with extreme variable values (one percent at both tails), and 
obtain a balanced panel of 36,103 firms. Panel A reports the ownership breakdown of our 
sample firms, where SOE stands for state-owned enterprises; Collective stands for 
collective firms; Private refers to privately owned firms; Mixed refers to the joint-stock 
companies; Foreign stands for foreign firms operating in China; and HK/TW stands for the 
Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan invested firms operating in China. Panel B presents the 
distribution of our sample firms by the 2-digit industry codes designated by the NBS. 
 
Panel A: by ownership 
 
 
# of Firms % of the sample 
 
   
SOE 4,799 13.29 
Collective 5,087 14.09 
Mixed 7,557 20.93 
Private 7,777 21.54 
HK/TW 5,482 15.18 
Foreign 5,401 14.97 
   
Total 36,103 100 
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Table 1 continued 
Panel B: by industry  
Industry 
Code Industry 
# of 
firms Percent 
    
6 Coal Mining 479 1.33 
7 Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction 10 0.03 
8 Ferrous Mining 61 0.17 
9 Nonferrous Mining 69 0.19 
10 Nonmetal Mining 193 0.53 
13 Timber Logging 1,465 4.06 
14 Food Production 697 1.93 
15 Beverage 538 1.49 
16 Tobacco 73 0.2 
17 Textile 2,738 7.58 
18 Textile Wearing Apparel , Footwear and Caps 1,410 3.91 
19 Leather 749 2.07 
20 Timber 377 1.04 
21 Furniture 347 0.96 
22 Papermaking 1,146 3.17 
23 Printing 888 2.46 
24 Cultural 465 1.29 
25 Petroleum Processing 201 0.56 
26 Raw Chemical 2,646 7.33 
27 Medical 839 2.32 
28 Chemical Fiber 172 0.48 
29 Rubber 528 1.46 
30 Plastic 1,609 4.46 
31 Nonmetal Products 2,899 8.03 
32 Pressing Ferrous 657 1.82 
33 Pressing of Nonferrous 545 1.51 
34 Metal Products 1,689 4.68 
35 Ordinary Machinery 2,763 7.65 
36 Special Equipment 1,284 3.56 
37 Transport Equipment 1,820 5.04 
39 Electrical Machinery and Equipment 3,218 8.91 
40 Communication Equipment, Computers and 
Other Electronic Equipment 701 1.94 
41 Measuring Instruments and Machinery for 
Cultural Activity and Office Work 818 2.27 
42 Artwork and Other Manufacturing 1,158 3.21 
44 Electric Power and Heat Power 85 0.24 
45 Gas Production 766 2.12 
46 Water Production 479 1.33 
    
Total  36,103 100 
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Table 2 Corporate Investment Rate by Ownership 
The investment rate is the ratio of fixed asset investment (Iit) to total assets (Kit). Due to 
data limitation, we can only estimate investment Euler equation models from 2003 to 2005. 
We thus report corporate investment rates in these three years.   
 
Panel A: Distribution of corporate investment rates by ownership  
 2003 2004 2005 average 
SOE 0.105 0.086 0.097 0.096 
Collective 0.155 0.139 0.146 0.148 
Mixed 0.156 0.138 0.145 0.146 
Private 0.196 0.173 0.166 0.177 
HK/TW 0.150 0.128 0.137 0.138 
Foreign 0.145 0.139 0.138 0.141 
Panel B: OLS regressions of investment rates on ownership and firm size, 2001-2005  
The dependent variable is (I/K)it, the coefficient of SOEs dummy is set to be zero. Firm 
size is measured by the natural log of the number of employees. t-statistics with robust 
standard errors reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent the significance levels at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Dprivate 
 
Dcollective 
 
Dmixed 
 
Dforeign 
 
DHK/TW 
 
LNLABOR 
 
Dprivate*LNLABOR 
 
Dcollective*LNLABOR  
 
Dmixed*LNLABOR  
 
Dforeign*LNLABOR  
 
DHK/TW*LNLABOR  
 
Adj. R-squared 
 
# of obs. 
 
0.0869*** 
(54.78) 
0.0535*** 
(33.25) 
0.0515*** 
(32.56) 
0.0451*** 
(26.58) 
0.0441*** 
(26.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0166 
 
180,515 
 
0.0914*** 
(57.28) 
0.0578*** 
(35.78) 
0.0495*** 
(31.26) 
0.0461*** 
(27.18) 
0.0446*** 
(27.18) 
0.0097*** 
(23.71) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0197 
 
180,515 
 
 
0.0127* 
(1.65) 
0.0582*** 
(7.58) 
0.0593*** 
(8.41) 
0.0024 
(0.31) 
-0.0028 
(-0.36) 
0.0563*** 
(6.37) 
0.0153*** 
(10.62) 
-0.0004 
(-0.30) 
-0.0016 
(-1.27) 
0.008*** 
(5.76) 
0.0087*** 
(6.32) 
0.0208 
 
180,515 
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Table 3 Summary Statistics 
The table presents the summary statistics of the key variables used in our empirical analysis 
from 2001 to 2005 (year 2000 is not included because investment data for that year are not 
available). We drop from our sample the firms with extreme variable values (one percent at 
both tails). We obtain a panel with 36,103 firms in each year. The definition of variables 
can be found in the first column.  Note that LNLABOR is the natural log of the number of 
the employees, NERI is a variable designed by Fan and Wang (2004) to examine the extent 
of marketization in each province in China, CFK is the ratio of cash flow to total assets, 
HIND is the Herfindahl index at the two-digit industry level, and finally, AGE captures 
firm age.  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Long term liabilities / 
total assets (TLTD) 
180,515 0.064 0.121 0.000 0.726 
Cash flow / total assets 
(CFK) 
180,515 0.034 0.132 -0.469 0.950 
Depreciation Rate 
(DRATE) 
180,515 0.172 0.250 0.000 0.700 
Total sales /total assets 
(ST) 
180,515 1.274 1.037 0.060 9.525 
Inventories / total assets 
(INVEN) 
180,515 0.181 0.141 0.000 0.696 
Income tax / total assets 
(TAX) 
180,515 0.009 0.015 0.000 0.122 
Sales costs / total assets 
(VC) 
180,515 1.094 0.965 0.038 8.447 
Current assets /total 
assets (CA)  
180,515 0.031 0.024 0.000 0.182 
Profits/total sales 
(INCOME) 
180,515 0.027 0.083 -0.663 0.331 
Investment Rate (Iit/Kit) 
 
180,515 0.149 0.194 0.000 0.976 
Industry Herfindahl 
index (HIND) 
180,515 0.011 0.015 0.001 0.486 
Firm size (LNLABOR) 
 
180,515 5.354 1.138 0.000 11.903 
LABOR 
 
180,515 500.4 2082.1 30 147,722 
NERI 
 
180,515 6.294 1.583 3.910 9.740 
Firm Age 
 
180,515 16.120 13.854 1 105 
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Table 4 GMM Estimates of Investment Euler Equations on the Full Sample 
We estimate investment Euler equations on a sample of industrial firms from a database 
maintained by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). Our sample contains 36,103 
industrial firms from 2001 to 2005. Nonlinear GMM estimations are conducted on the model 
in first differences with twice lagged instruments. There are in total 22 instruments in our 
estimations.  α is the adjustment cost parameter to be estimated, and µ is a mark-up. Dprivate, 
Dcollective, Dmixed, Dforeign, DHK/TW and DSOE are dummy variables indicating a firm’s ownership 
type. The estimated coefficients of DSOE, and DSOE*LNLABOR are set to be zero. LNLABOR 
is the natural logarithm of the number of the employees, CFK is the ratio of cash flow to total 
assets; HIND measures the industry-level Herfindahl index; TLTD is the ratio of long-term 
liabilities to total assets.  NERI is a variable designed by Fan and Wang (2004) to examine the 
extent of marketization in each province in China. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
The p-values of the J-Test and L-Test on model specification are reported in the last two rows. 
*, **, and *** represent the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
α 
 
µ 
 
Dprivate 
 
Dcollective 
 
Dmixed 
 
Dforeign 
 
DHK/TW 
 
LNLABOR 
 
Dprivate*LNLABOR 
 
Dcollective*LNLABOR  
 
Dmixed*LNLABOR  
 
Dforeign*LNLABOR  
 
DHK/TW*LNLABOR  
 
HIND 
 
NERI 
 
TLTD 
 
                
           Chi-squared 
   Degree of freedom 
J-Test 
L-Test 
 0.072* 
(0.041) 
 1.011*** 
(0.055) 
-0.979*** 
(0.202) 
-1.038*** 
(0.235) 
-0.476 
(0.361) 
-0.852*** 
(0.151) 
-0.896*** 
(0.279) 
-0.143*** 
(0.023) 
 0.167*** 
(0.038) 
 0.165*** 
(0.046) 
 0.068 
(0.059) 
 0.152*** 
(0.024) 
 0.151*** 
(0.037) 
-1.275 
(1.096) 
-0.021 
(0.015) 
 0.048 
(0.365) 
 
6.531 
 6 
 0.366 
n.a. 
 0.059** 
(0.031) 
 1.104*** 
(0.038) 
-1.098*** 
(0.329) 
-0.926*** 
(0.225) 
-1.315*** 
(0.326) 
-1.129*** 
(0.137) 
-1.067*** 
(0.232) 
-0.159*** 
(0.019) 
0.179*** 
(0.057) 
 0.135*** 
(0.046) 
 0.207*** 
(0.050) 
 0.186*** 
(0.022) 
 0.167*** 
(0.029) 
-1.076 
(0.661) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
 
 
 
7.153 
7 
0.413 
0.431 
 
 
 
 0.057** 
(0.026) 
 1.102*** 
(0.036) 
-1.175*** 
(0.177) 
-0.879*** 
(0.205) 
-1.163*** 
(0.219) 
-1.085*** 
(0.091) 
-0.991*** 
(0.143) 
-0.157*** 
(0.011) 
0.202*** 
(0.034) 
 0.143*** 
(0.043) 
 0.193*** 
(0.032) 
 0.184*** 
(0.021) 
 0.163*** 
(0.019) 
-1.047* 
(0.591) 
 
 
 
 
 
7.468 
8 
0.487 
0.575 
 0.057** 
(0.027) 
 1.086*** 
(0.039) 
-1.068*** 
(0.173) 
-0.918*** 
(0.193) 
-1.281*** 
(0.193) 
-0.968*** 
(0.101) 
-0.852*** 
(0.125) 
-0.171*** 
(0.008) 
 0.174*** 
(0.034) 
 0.135*** 
(0.041) 
 0.202*** 
(0.029) 
 0.173*** 
(0.028) 
0.149*** 
(0.021) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.851 
9 
0.286 
0.066 
 0.111* 
(0.061) 
 1.022*** 
(0.019) 
-0.307*** 
(0.059) 
-0.287*** 
(0.062) 
-0.335*** 
(0.072) 
-0.241** 
(0.102) 
-0.312*** 
(0.072) 
-0.098*** 
(0.012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27.973 
14 
0.014 
0.000 
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Table 5 GMM Estimates of Investment Euler Equations: Controlling for Industries 
We estimate investment Euler equation models on various Chinese industries for 2003-2005. We choose the 
industries with sizeable number of firms in our sample (see Table 1). Columns (1) – (5) report the 
estimation results for the textile (17), raw chemical (26), nonmetal products (31), ordinary machinery (35), 
and electrical machinery and equipments (39) industries, respectively.  Column (6) reports the estimation 
results on the full sample, in which we include thirty-seven industry dummies into the discount factor 
function. GMM estimation is conducted on the model in first differences with twice lagged instruments. α  
is the adjustment cost parameter to be estimated, and µ is a mark-up. Dprivate, Dcollective, Dmixed, Dforeign, DHK/TW 
and DSOE are dummy variables indicating a firm’s ownership type. The estimated coefficients of DSOE, and 
DSOE*LNLABOR are set to be zero. LNLABOR is the natural logarithm of the number of the employees. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The p-values of the J-Test on model specification are reported 
in the last row. *, **, and *** represent the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 (1) Textile (2) Raw 
Chemical 
(3)Nonmetal 
Products 
(4)Ordinary 
Machinery 
(5)Elec. 
Machinery 
(6) Full 
sample  
α 
 
µ 
 
Dprivate 
 
Dcollective 
 
Dmixed 
 
Dforeign 
 
DHK/TW 
 
LNLABOR 
 
Dprivate*LNLABOR 
 
Dcollective*LNLABOR  
 
Dmixed*LNLABOR  
 
Dforeign*LNLABOR  
 
DHK/TW*LNLABOR  
 
# of firms (% of full 
sample) 
           Chi-squared 
   Degree of freedom 
J-Test 
 0.072* 
(0.040) 
 1.241*** 
(0.079) 
-0.826*** 
(0.167) 
-1.027*** 
(0.115) 
-1.048*** 
(0.117) 
-1.127*** 
(0.167) 
-0.777*** 
(0.243) 
-0.132*** 
(0.008) 
 0.097*** 
(0.033) 
 0.139*** 
(0.019) 
 0.136*** 
(0.020) 
 0.156*** 
(0.035) 
 0.088* 
(0.051) 
2,738 
(7.6%) 
4.903 
 7 
0.672 
 
 
 0.031 
(0.087) 
 0.923*** 
(0.110) 
-1.055*** 
(0.094) 
-1.061*** 
(0.094) 
-0.833*** 
(0.127) 
-0.894*** 
(0.267) 
-1.567*** 
(0.475) 
-0.155*** 
(0.010) 
0.166*** 
(0.024) 
 0.165*** 
(0.021) 
 0.121*** 
(0.022) 
 0.133** 
(0.062) 
 0.271*** 
(0.094) 
2,646 
 (7.3%) 
7.236 
7 
0.405 
 
 
 0.041 
(0.077) 
 1.076*** 
(0.027) 
-1.121*** 
(0.254) 
-1.122*** 
(0.221) 
-0.805*** 
(0.196) 
-1.452*** 
(0.559) 
-0.081 
(0.501) 
-0.147*** 
(0.007) 
0.166*** 
(0.048) 
 0.167*** 
(0.041) 
 0.112*** 
(0.034) 
 0.241** 
(0.112) 
 -0.041 
(0.109) 
2,899 
 (8.0%) 
5.973 
7 
0.543 
 
 0.027 
(0.041) 
 1.063*** 
(0.039) 
-1.011*** 
(0.073) 
-0.766*** 
(0.231) 
-0.847*** 
(0.182) 
-1.308*** 
(0.295) 
-0.979*** 
(0.165) 
-0.175*** 
(0.012) 
0.182*** 
(0.021) 
 0.129*** 
(0.040) 
 0.136*** 
(0.031) 
 0.224*** 
(0.055) 
 0.153*** 
(0.045) 
2,763 
 (7.7%) 
12.585 
7 
0.083 
 
 0.141* 
(0.076) 
 1.004*** 
(0.038) 
-1.470*** 
(0.378) 
-1.059*** 
(0.242) 
-0.319 
(0.473) 
-1.107*** 
(0.218) 
-0.394 
(0.532) 
-0.187*** 
(0.017) 
 0.288*** 
(0.085) 
 0.190*** 
(0.042) 
 0.051 
(0.085) 
 0.209*** 
(0.038) 
 0.072 
(0.091) 
3,218 
 (8.9%) 
3.247 
7 
0.861 
 
 
 0.045** 
(0.022) 
 1.104*** 
(0.027) 
-0.854*** 
(0.175) 
-0.935*** 
(0.215) 
 -1.158*** 
(0.221) 
-1.064*** 
(0.186) 
 -0.962*** 
(0.095) 
-0.145*** 
(0.014) 
 0.137*** 
(0.039) 
 0.131*** 
(0.047) 
 0.170*** 
(0.032)) 
 0.168*** 
(0.021) 
 0.130*** 
(0.029) 
36,103  
(100%) 
5.925 
7 
0.549 
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Table 6 GMM Estimates of Investment Euler Equations on the Privatized SOEs 
We estimate the investment Euler equation models over a sub-sample of firms that were 
privatized during the 2003-2005 period. We start with 4,799 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
in 2003. 500 firms changed their ownership status to mixed (joint stock); and 98 firms 
changed their ownership status to private either in 2004 or 2005. We create two dummies 
variables MIX and Private, both of which take the value of 1 if an SOE’s status is either a 
mixed or private firm in that year. Nonlinear GMM estimation is conducted on the model 
in first differences with twice lagged instruments. There are in total 20 instruments in our 
estimations.  α is the are adjustment cost parameter to be estimated, and µ is a mark-up. 
LNLABOR is the natural logarithm of the number of the employees; HIND measures the 
industry-level Hirfindahl index; NERI is a variable designed by Fan and Wang (2004) to 
examine the extent of marketization in each province in China. TLTD is the ratio long-term 
liabilities to total assets.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The p-values of the J-
Test and L-Test on model specification are reported in the last two rows.  
*, **, and *** represent the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
α 
 
µ 
 
MIX 
 
Private 
 
         LNLABOR 
 
MIX*LNLABOR  
 
Private*LNLABOR  
 
HIND 
 
NERI 
 
TLTD 
 
                
           Chi-squared 
   Degree of freedom 
J-Test 
L-Test 
 0.051 
(0.073) 
 1.110*** 
(0.051) 
-0.344** 
(0.166) 
-1.138 
(1.672) 
-0.039** 
(0.017) 
 0.056** 
(0.027) 
 0.231 
(0.465) 
 -1.579* 
(0.921) 
-0.112*** 
(0.012) 
-0.473** 
(0.222) 
 
13.006 
10 
0.223 
n.a. 
 0.057 
(0.041) 
 1.091*** 
(0.061) 
-0.495** 
(0.243) 
 
 
-0.031** 
(0.018) 
 0.071*** 
(0.023) 
  
 
 -2.032*** 
(0.781) 
-0.118*** 
(0.012) 
-0.516*** 
(0.159) 
 
15.384 
12 
0.221 
0.305 
 0.055 
(0.064) 
1.093*** 
(0.043) 
-0.061*** 
(0.018) 
 
 
-0.033* 
(0.015) 
 
 
 
 
 -1.844*** 
(0.675) 
-0.117*** 
(0.012) 
-0.478*** 
(0.162) 
 
18.527 
13 
0.139 
0.076 
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Table 7 GMM Estimates of Investment Euler Equation on the Listed Firms, 1999 to 
2005 
We estimate the investment Euler equation model against another firm population --- the 
universe of China’s listed firms. We exclude financial firms and firms with missing 
variables, and obtain a balanced sample with 646 listed firms. We construct several 
corporate governance variables to capture the impact of institutions on the discount factor 
perceived by firm managers. The detailed definition is in the first column of the table. 
LNLABOR is the natural log of the number of the employees, H- and B- dummy specifies 
whether a firm has shares issued to and traded by foreign investors. CFK is the ratio of cash 
flow to total assets; HIND measures the industry-level Hirfindahl index; B/M refers to 
book to market ratio. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The p-value of the J-Test 
on the model specification is reported in the last row. 
***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
         GMM estimated coefficients 
α 
 
µ 
 
SOE dummy 
 
H- or B- share dummy 
 
Is CEO also the Board Chairman? 
 
Percentage of Shares held by controlling shareholder 
 
Outside board members / total board members 
 
Is the listed firm one part of a group? 
 
LNLABOR 
 
CFK 
 
HIND 
 
β – measure of systematic risk 
 
B/M 
 
Chi-squared 
 
J-Test 
 
 0.091* 
(0.047) 
 1.119*** 
(0.161) 
 0.158*** 
(0.053) 
-0.502** 
(0.218) 
 -0.035 
(0.036) 
-1.361** 
(0.593) 
-1.001* 
(0.517) 
 0.051 
(0.047) 
-0.112*** 
(0.029) 
 0.081 
(0.075) 
 0.040 
(0.037) 
-0.306 
(0.521) 
 0.401 
(0.432) 
10.302 
 
0.142 
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Table A1 GDP, Fixed Asset Investment, and FDI in China 1990-2005 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook  
Exchange rate: 1 US$ = RMB 8.026 
 
      
Year Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
(RMB bn) 
Fixed asset 
investment 
(RMB bn) 
Percent of 
GDP 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investments 
(USD bn) 
Percent of 
GDP 
1990 1871.8 451.7 24.13% 3.49 1.50% 
1991 2182.6 559.5 25.63% 4.37 1.61% 
1992 2693.7 808.0 30.00% 11.01 3.28% 
1993 3526.0 1307.2 37.07% 27.52 6.26% 
1994 4810.9 1704.3 35.43% 33.77 5.63% 
1995 5981.1 2001.9 33.47% 37.52 5.03% 
1996 7014.3 2291.4 32.67% 41.73 4.77% 
1997 7765.3 2494.1 32.12% 45.26 4.68% 
1998 8302.4 2840.6 34.21% 45.46 4.39% 
1999 8818.9 2985.5 33.85% 40.32 3.67% 
2000 9800.1 3291.8 33.59% 40.72 3.33% 
2001 10806.8 3721.4 34.44% 46.88 3.48% 
2002 11909.6 4349.9 36.52% 52.74 3.55% 
2003 13517.4 5556.7 41.11% 53.51 3.18% 
2004 15958.7 7047.7 44.16% 60.63 3.05% 
      2005 18395.6 8877.4 48.26% 60.33 2.63% 
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Table A2 Fixed Asset Investment by Ownership 2000-2005 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Unit: RMB bn  
 Fixed Asset Investment     
       
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
2005 
SOE 1650.4 1760.7 1887.7 2166.1 2502.8 2966.7 
 50.14% 47.31% 43.40% 38.98% 35.51% 33.42%
       
Collective 489.6 537.3 612.6 819.8 1018.3 1219.9 
 14.87% 14.44% 14.08% 14.75% 14.45% 13.74%
       
Mixed 406.2 566.4 832.9 1273.4 1769.8 2353.6 
 12.34% 15.22% 19.15% 22.92% 25.11% 26.51%
       
Private 470.9 542.9 651.9 772.0 988.1 1389.1 
 14.31% 14.59% 14.99% 13.89% 14.02% 15.65%
       
HK/TW 129.3 158.3 176.5 237.5 311.4 376.7  
 3.93% 4.25% 4.06% 4.27% 4.42% 4.24% 
       
Foreign 131.3 141.5 168.5 253.4 385.4 465.7 
 3.99% 3.80% 3.87% 4.56% 5.47% 5.25% 
       
Others 13.9 14.2 19.8 34.6 72.1 105.7  
 0.42% 0.38% 0.46% 0.62% 1.02% 1.19% 
       
       
Total 3291.8 3721.3 4349.9 5556.7 7047.7 8877.4 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table A3 The Breakdown of Sample Firms by Region 
 
Code Region # of firms Percent 
11 Beijing 993 2.75 
12 Tianjin 936 2.59 
13 Hebei 1,337 3.7 
14 Shanxi 511 1.42 
15 Inner Mongolia 292 0.81 
21 Liaoning 1,352 3.74 
22 Jilin 337 0.93 
23 Heilongjiang 357 0.99 
31 Shanghai 2,664 7.38 
32 Jiangsu 4,911 13.6 
33 Zhejiang 5,399 14.95 
34 Anhui 649 1.8 
35 Fujian 2,254 6.24 
36 Jiangxi 284 0.79 
37 Shandong 2,561 7.09 
41 Henan 1,313 3.64 
42 Hubei 590 1.63 
43 Hunan 364 1.01 
44 Guangdong 4,721 13.08 
45 Guangxi 488 1.35 
46 Hainan 100 0.28 
50 Chongqing+Sichuan 1,666 4.61 
52 Guizhou 403 1.12 
53 Yunnan 537 1.49 
54 Tibet+Qinghai+Ningxia 121 0.34 
61 Shaanxi 502 1.39 
62 Gansu 235 0.65 
65 Xinjiang 226 0.63 
    
Total  36,103 100 
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Figure 1 The Investment-Implied Return on Captial By Ownership: 2001-2005
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Note: We plug the variable values for each firm into the estimated discount factor function as specified in Model 3 of Table 4 (the 
benchmark model). We make an assumption that the average discount rate for all of the firms in our sample is 10%. We thus back out 
the value of the intercept in the discount factor function, 1.904. We then compute the investment-implied discount rate for each firm in 
each year. We aggregate those firm-year observations by ownership and year. 
